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Sell-side analysts are important information intermediaries in capital markets and as a result 
their research has been under scrutiny. While a large number of studies document that analyst 
coverage and forecasts have economic consequences (Bailey et al., 2003; Jackson, 2005), an 
equally large number of studies document that analyst forecasts are influenced by conflicts of 
interest (Beyer and Guttman, 2011; Cowen et al., 2006; Hong and Kubik, 2003; Jackson, 
2005; Lim, 2001; Richardson et al., 2004; Schipper, 1991). In this paper we concentrate on 
the banking industry and investigate whether analyst forecasts are biased because of career 
concerns. 
 Past studies have documented that analyst forecasts can be biased because of 
underwriting activities in the investment banking business, pressure to generate trading 
commissions, and career concerns (Hunton and McEwen, 1997; Lin and McNichols, 1998; 
Michaely and Womack, 1999; Dugar and Nathan, 1995; Dechow et al., 2000; O’Brien et al., 
2005; Hong and Kubik, 2003). In terms of career concerns, past studies have documented that 
more optimistic analysts tend to experience favorable job separations (Hong and Kubik, 
2003) and younger analysts tend to herd more (Hong et al., 2000). In these studies, the 
underlying source of career concerns is pressure from investment banking and/or brokerage 
business to please companies or buy-side portfolio managers respectively.  
 In this paper, we concentrate on a different source of conflicts of interest. Banking 
analysts issue forecasts for companies that constitute a large part of their outside 
opportunities in terms of employment. These analysts view the banks that they issue forecasts 
for as potential sources of employment, thereby increasing their incentives to satisfy those 
clients. This is independent of incentives to generate investment banking business or trading 
commissions, which exist for all companies they cover.  
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In order to examine whether this pressure to satisfy future potential employers is 
influencing analyst forecasts, we examine the pattern in the bias of their forecasts. In our 
research design we hold the analyst constant by requiring that the same analyst is forecasting 
earnings for companies with sell-side equity departments (‘employers’) and for companies 
with no sell-side equity departments (‘non-employers’). We then show that banking analysts 
issue forecasts that are relatively more optimistic for employers in the beginning of the year. 
At the end of the year the opposite is true; banking analysts issue forecasts that are relatively 
more pessimistic for employers. Therefore, our research design is similar to a differences-in-
difference specification where we observe, for the same set of analysts, the forecasting 
pattern early and late in the year and we compare this pattern for employers and non-
employers. We limit our sample to those analysts who are not employed by the top 
investment banks and therefore could have relatively greater career concerns. Analysts that 
are already working for bulge investment banks have greater career opportunities and less 
incentive to move as they already work at the most reputable banks. Therefore, we treat 
analysts working at the top banks as a control group that allow us to scale our dependent 
variable of forecast bias. We report results using both this relative bias variable and an 
absolute bias variable relative to the stock price of the firm. We find similar results across 
both measures. 
To further identify the effect of career concerns from forecasting earnings of a 
potential future employer we exploit an exogenous shock to future career opportunities. The 
Global Settlement of 2003 decreased significantly the budgets for sell-side research and as a 
result directly impacted the outside opportunities for sell-side analysts (Cowen et al., 2006). 
This could lead to exacerbation of career concerns and as a result a more pronounced walk-
down to beatable earnings for employers. On the other hand, after the Global Settlement, the 
analysts could be more reluctant to bias their forecasts because that might anger other 
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constituents that consume their forecasts, raising the probability of dismissal. The probability 
of a promotion at another firm might not look as attractive if analysts are more worried about 
just keeping their jobs after the settlement. We find that after the Global Settlement the 
transition from optimistic to pessimistic forecasts closer to the year-end is stronger. These 
findings are consistent with banking analysts understanding that their forecasts could impact 
future career opportunities and as a result provide a walk-down to beatable earnings.  
We analyze future job separations to understand whether analysts benefit from such 
forecasting activity. We find that banking analysts who are pessimistic at their latest forecast 
are more likely to experience favorable job separations and move to a higher status brokerage 
house. This result is present only for analysts that exhibit this behavior towards employers, 
again consistent with analysts strategically biasing their forecasts because of career concerns. 
Our identification strategy aims to mitigate the likelihood that other sources of bias, 
unrelated to a revolving door story, might cause our results. We do so by differentiating both 
across types of firms being forecasted (i.e. a bank with or without a research department) as 
well as across analysts (i.e. employed by a top-bank versus a non-top bank). We show that a 
walk-down to beatable earnings and upward job mobility is more pronounced when an 
analyst works for a non-top bank and forecasts earnings of a bank with a research department. 
It is hard to reconcile these findings with biases due to incentives to generate investment 
banking business or trading commissions, which should be present in both types of forecasted 
firms or analysts. For example, bias arising from incentives to generate investment banking 
business should be strong for banks with or without research departments and it should be 
less pronounced after the Global Settlement. Similarly, incentives to generate trading 
commissions should be as strong for analysts working at top banks and when forecasting 
earnings for banks without research departments. Of course, if for example, investment 
banking business or trading commissions are significantly higher for banks with research 
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departments and analysts in non-top banks have stronger incentives to bias their forecasts to 
generate investment banking business or trading commissions that could explain our results. 
However, in our matched sample, banks with and without research departments exhibit very 
similar market capitalization, valuation ratios, analyst following, share turnover, and risk; all 
variables that could be related to investment banking or trading commission sources of bias. 
Moreover, reduced competition, due to brokerage house closures, following the Global 
Settlement could explain our results (Hong and Kacperczyk, 2010). We address this concern 
by examining whether the pattern we document holds for firms where analyst coverage did 
not decrease after the Global Settlement and therefore the competition effect is not at play. 
We find similar results for this subsample. 
Our results contribute to a body of literature that investigates the sources of bias in 
analyst forecasts (Cowen et al., 2006). We complement this line of research by documenting 
a different source of conflict of interest. Effectively the conflict we document here relates to 
the ‘revolving-door’ phenomenon, which has been investigated in relation to audit partners 
(Menon and Williams, 2004; Geiger et al., 2005), SEC lawyers (deHaan et al., 2015), and 
credit rating analysts (Cornaggia et al., 2016). We show that this effect generalizes in settings 
outside auditing and, consistent with Cornaggia et al. (2016), affects information 
intermediaries more broadly.  
The results in this paper contribute also to a literature that seeks to understand 
whether financial institutions are more opaque and therefore characterized by higher 
information asymmetry and more information risk (Morgan, 2002; Flannery et al., 2004).  
Given that sell-side analyst activity improves the information efficiency of capital markets, 
our results suggest that the career concerns banking analysts are facing could contribute to a 
poorer information environment for financial institutions.  
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The paper proceeds as follows. In Section 2, we review the related literature and form 
the hypotheses of this study. Section 3 describes the data and research design. Section 4 
details the descriptive statistics and we present the results in Section 5. We conclude in 
Section 6.  
 
2. Past literature and hypotheses development 
 
If analyst forecasts are formed objectively and errors arise from unforeseen events, there 
should not be any trend over time in the distribution of earnings surprises. Similarly, if 
analyst forecasts are unbiased, there is no reason to think that the distribution of surprises 
should differ across different types of firms or industries. However, the existence of an 
optimistic bias in analyst forecasts is well documented in many studies (Fried and Givoly, 
1982; Klein, 1990; Brown et al., 1987; O’Brien, 1988; Affleck-Graves et al., 1990).  
The evidence of forecast bias has led to many studies proposing and testing incentive-
based explanations. For example, analysts have incentives to maximize the trading volume in 
the stock they cover to increase trading commissions earned (Jackson, 2005; Cowen et al., 
2006; Beyer and Guttman, 2011). Similarly, evidence suggests that analysts from brokerage 
houses that have underwriting relationships with a company tend to issue more optimistic 
forecasts (but not less accurate) than unaffiliated analysts (Hunton and McEwen, 1997; Lin 
and McNichols, 1998; Michaely and Womack, 1999; Dugar and Nathan, 1995; Dechow et 
al., 2000; and O’Brien et al., 2005).  
Similarly, they are likely to take into account the impact their forecasts may have on 
their relationship with management (to increase investment banking business or to curry 
favor with management to obtain and maintain access to private information) by issuing 
favorable (Schipper, 1991; Lim, 2001) or beatable (Richardson et al., 2004; Bartov et al., 
2002) earnings forecasts. More recent literature examines the inter-temporal pattern in 
forecast bias and finds a trend from optimism to pessimism within both quarterly and annual 
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fiscal periods (Cowen et al., 2006; Richardson et al., 2004; Ke and Yu, 2006). Cowen et al. 
(2006) document for a sample of forecasts issued from January 1996 to December 2002, 180 
day+ forecasts are positively biased, 91 to 180-day forecasts are unbiased, and 0 to 90-day 
forecasts are negatively biased. Similarly, Richardson et al. (2004) document the optimistic to 
pessimistic pattern (or ‘walk-down’) of both annual and quarterly forecasts and Ke and Yu 
(2006) find that annual forecasts are on average optimistic and quarterly are pessimistic. The 
walk down of expectations is found to benefit both analysts and firms subject to the forecast. 
Ke and Yu (2006) finds that analysts with an optimistic to pessimistic pattern of forecasts are 
less likely to be fired by their employers, relative to analysts not providing such a pattern. 
While Bartov et al. (2002) finds that firms who beat their earnings expectations enjoy a 
higher overall return than firms who fail to do so, despite the expense of a drop in the share 
price following the walk-down in expectations. 
Unlike other analysts, banking analysts issue forecasts for companies that constitute a 
large part of their outside opportunities in terms of employment. These analysts may view the 
banks with sell-side equity departments that they issue forecasts for as potential sources of 
employment (‘employers’), as opposed to forecasting companies with no sell side equity 
department (‘non-employers’) thereby increasing their incentives to satisfy the former. This is 
independent of incentives to generate investment banking business or trading commissions 
for their own employers that should exist when making forecasts for all companies they 
cover. If this is true then analysts who forecasts both employers and non-employers will have 
stronger career incentives (resulting in a greater need to curry favor with the managers from 
these potential employers), and therefore are more likely to bias their forecasts for the 
employers relative to the non-employers they cover. This leads us to our first hypothesis: 
 
Hypothesis 1. The change in the bias of the forecasts over time from optimistic to pessimistic 
is greater when forecasting earnings of employers relative to non-employers.    
	 8	
 
To further explore the effect of analyst career concerns we employ the Global 
Settlement of 2003 as an exogenous shock. This regulation changed the way brokerage firms 
profit from analyst activity and thereby increased the level of competition in the sell-side 
analyst labor market. The Global Settlement was initiated to curb the biased research 
produced by brokerage houses and resulted in ten of the largest banks paying nearly $1.4 
billion in fines. Among other provisions, the Global Settlement created a “Chinese Wall” 
between the research divisions and the investment banking divisions of brokerage houses. 
Importantly, these provisions prohibited the explicit cross-subsidization of research activities 
from underwriting activities, drastically altering the demand for sell-side analysts at 
investment banks.  
This regulatory shock changed the labor market landscape. As Cowen et al. (2006) 
note, investment banks decreased their spending on equity research by more than 40% as 
compared to 2000 levels, which reduced analyst head count on average by 15% to 20% and 
cut analysts’ compensation by a third or more. This significant increase in competition in the 
sell-side analyst labor market allows us to test the effect of future career concerns on forecast 
bias. The sign of this effect, increasing or reducing analyst bias, however is unclear. It could 
be the case that, following the Global Settlement, forecast bias decreases as analysts switch 
their focus, to one of keeping their current job rather than striving for promotion at another 
investment bank. Under this scenario, analysts may take fewer risks and be reluctant to issue 
significantly biased forecasts just in case it potentially displeases their clients and thereby 
increases the likelihood of dismissal.1 An alternative scenario, is that following the Global 
Settlement, analyst career concerns may have been exacerbated and consequently analysts 
may have stronger incentives to walk down their forecasts to beatable earnings. This could be 
particularly true for our sample as the Global Settlement focused much more on the top banks 
																																								 																				
1 We would like to thank our anonymous reviewer for highlighting this possible scenario. 
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(which were the subject of the Settlement) than medium and low tier banks. Ultimately the 
effect of the Global Settlement on analyst career concerns is an empirical question and leads 
us to our second hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 2. The bias of the forecasts over time from optimistic to pessimistic due to career 
concerns changes following the Global Settlement.  
Prior research also investigates whether forecast bias is associated with an analyst’s 
career and subsequent advancement (Ke and Yu, 2006; Hong and Kubik, 2003; Lourie, 
2014). Ke and Yu (2006) find that analysts who issue initial optimistic forecasts followed by 
pessimistic forecasts, just before the earnings announcement, are less likely to be fired by 
their employers. Hong and Kubik (2003) find that the association between accuracy and 
turnover varies with the analysts’ level of optimism and affiliation status. In particular, 
controlling for accuracy, analysts who issue optimistic earnings forecasts relative to the 
consensus are more likely to experience favorable job separations and thereby move up the 
brokerage house hierarchy. Furthermore, the turnover decisions of affiliated analysts depends 
less on accuracy and more on optimism than those of unaffiliated analysts.  
The revolving-door literature also provides evidence that career incentives may cause 
individuals to lose objectivity in their assessment of potential future employers. Lourie 
(2014) investigates the forecast bias of analysts who leave the profession and are 
subsequently hired by firms the analyst had previously covered. He finds that analysts prior 
to their new employment provide more optimistic recommendations and higher target prices, 
for the firms that subsequently hire them, although he finds no systematic forecast earnings 
bias for these firms. Cornaggia et al. (2016), investigates the revolving door phenomenon, in 
relation to credit rating analysts and finds that transitioning credit rating analysts become 
more favorable to their future employers prior to their transition. They conclude that these 
conflicts of interest at the analyst level distort credit ratings. 
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 If analysts are biasing employers’ forecasts because of future career incentives, then 
following the findings of Hong and Kubik (2003) we would expect such analysts to benefit 
from this activity and thereby experience more favorable job separations. This leads us to our 
third hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 3. Analysts who provide more biased earnings forecasts for employers are more 
likely to experience favorable job separations. 
 
 3. Data and research design 
 
3.1. Sample of analysts 
 
We obtain data on all individual analysts’ forecasts of annual earnings per share from the 
Institutional Brokers Estimate System (I/B/E/S) Detail File. For a sample period from 1999 to 
2006, we identify all banks with investment arms. This identification starts with the SIC 
codes 60-62,2 and the Bloomberg categorization of investment services, but in order to be 
confident in our identification process we also use the information disclosed in the banks’ 
annual reports and websites to validate our identification. We do not include observations 
post 2006 due to the financial crisis, although we find that our results are not sensitive to 
extending the sample period to 2012.3 From this sample we extract sell-side analysts that 
follow both firms with sell-side equity departments (for convenience we term these 
‘employers’) and firms with no sell-side equity departments (again for convenience we term 
these ‘non-employers’). Requiring that the same analysts make forecasts across both groups 
mitigates the probability that differences in the results are driven by differences in the types 
of analysts making the forecasts. Moreover, since we find that well over 90% of our 
investment bank sample are within the S&P 500, we also limit our analysis to S&P500 firms 
																																								 																				
2 We do not however classify those firms with a SIC code of 6099 (commercial banks) and 6111 (credit and debit card 
issuer) as employers. 
3 The global financial crisis is commonly believed to have begun in July 2007, and given we are investigating both the first 
and last analysts forecasts we limit our sample period to the end of 2006.  
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only; this again mitigates the probability that differences in the results are driven by 
differences in the types of firms being forecasted. However, if we relax both of these 
requirements the results continue to hold.  
Similar to prior literature (Hong et al., 2000; Richardson et al., 2004; Kim et al., 
2011) we consider only the last and first forecast for each analyst-firm pair during the twelve 
months of the annual earnings release date reported by I/B/E/S period. We exclude 
observations with forecast horizons shorter than one month and longer than one year 
(Clement and Tse, 2005) and also exclude those observations with negative price-to-book 
ratios and stock prices less than or equal to one dollar, thereby ensuring that illiquid stocks do 
not influence our results.  
To obtain a benchmark of forecast bias when career concerns are weaker that allows 
us to better identify the effect of career concerns on forecasts, we use top brokerage house 
analysts as a control group. Given our focus is on analysts’ career concerns we exclude from 
our sample all analysts employed by the top brokerage houses4 (defined in the next section 
3.2.) because these analysts will have lower career concerns as they already work for a top 
brokerage house and are less likely to bias their forecast to satisfy potential future employers. 
If this assumption is incorrect and analysts at top investment banks have equally strong 
incentives to walk-down expectations this would bias our analysis against finding any results. 
Thus, our sample only captures those analysts who have stronger incentives to satisfy 
potential future employees and move up the brokerage house echelons. Our sample contains 
228 individual analysts who issue forecasts in the same year for both employers and non-
employers. The additional firm-specific data is obtained from Compustat. 
3.2. Measuring brokerage house status 
To classify the brokerage houses into different status groups, consistent with Hong and Kubik 
																																								 																				
4 Although we exclude the analysts from the top brokerage houses from the sample we do use their forecasts to determine 
the relative forecast bias.  
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(2003), we measure the status of the brokerage house based on the number of analysts from 
each brokerage house who issue forecast reports. Unfortunately, we were unable to use an 
external ranking system, such as the one published by Institutional Investor, as we could not 
identify the exact name of the brokerage house that the analysts worked for (since I/B/E/S 
simply provides a code for each brokerage house not the name).5 However, Hong and Kubik 
(2003) find that this alternative measure of brokerage house status based on the size of a 
brokerage house is highly correlated to the Institutional Investor ranking system. To replicate 
Hong and Kubik (2003) proportions of brokerage houses identified as top, medium and low 
status we identify a high-status house as a brokerage house in the top 3% in terms of size 
each year. Low-status is any brokerage house size below the average house size each year 
and the remaining are identified as middle-status houses. Consistent with Hong and Kubik 
(2003) who report that approximately 29% of their sample analysts are identified as 
employed by high status brokerage houses, we find approximately 31.5% of our sample 
analysts are identified as being employed by high-status houses. Moreover, we find that 
approximately 22.2% and 46.3% of analysts worked in low-status houses and median-status 
houses respectively, which again is consistent with the statistics reported by Hong and Kubik 
(2003).6 
3.3. Research design: Measuring forecast bias 
To measure analyst bias, we adopt two approaches used in prior literature (Jacob et al., 1999; 
Clement, 1999; Hong and Kubik, 2003; Cowen et al., 2006; Walther and Willis, 2013). Our 
first measure compares the optimism of a given analyst’s forecast for a particular firm and 
time period to the mean optimism of all analysts employed by the top brokerage houses who 
make forecasts for the same firm and time period within a comparable forecast horizon. This 
requires us to exclude those firms followed by fewer than three analysts as our forecast bias 
																																								 																				
5 We were unable to obtain the Broker Transaction file which would enable us to identify the brokerage houses’ name.	
6 We investigated alternative cut-off points, however, our results are not sensitive to either a 1% increase or decrease to this 
identification metric. 
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measure requires intra firm-year variation (Clement and Tse, 2003; Kerl and Ohlert, 2015). 
Note, this constraint reduces the number of firm-year observations but not the number of 
individual analysts. This relative performance metric controls for any company-specific or 
time-specific factors that affect forecast optimism. We define forecast bias of analyst i for 
firm j in year t (FBijt) as the signed difference between the forecast and the actual earnings 
per share (EPS).  Where: 
FBijt=Forecast EPSijt-Actual EPSijt 
 





where Avg(TopFBjt) is the average forecast bias across all analysts working at top brokerage 
houses, as defined above, for firm j in year t. 
Our second measure consistent with Walther and Willis (2013) is an absolute forecast 





where Pjt is the share price from firm j for year t issued 10 trading days before the forecast 
release date. 
If either Rel_DFBijt or Abs_DFBijt is positive, then the analyst forecast is 
optimistically biased (positively biased) whereas if it is negative then the analyst forecast is 
pessimistically biased (negatively biased). We calculate two Rel_DFBijt (and two 
Abs_DFBijt), one for the first forecast and one for last forecast analyst i makes for firm j in 
year t.  
3.4. Modeling forecast bias between employers and non-employers 
																																								 																				
7	We deflate the variable with the absolute mean of the top analysts forecast error for each firm-year since Clement (1999) 
shows that this procedure reduces heteroscedasticity. 
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To test hypothesis 1, that employer forecasts are relatively more biased than non-employer 
forecasts, we estimate the following cross-sectional regression that includes an indicator 
variable EMPLOYER that equals one if the analyst is forecasting earnings of a potential 
future employer and zero otherwise: 
Rel_DFBijt  (or  Abs_DFBijt )=  b1EMPLOYER + b2Earn_Stdjt+ b3Ln(MVjt ) 
+b4Ln(BTMjt)+b5Ln(Followjt)+ b6F_Horizonijt +b7dayElapijt +b8frijt +b9Firm_Expijt + 
b10Gen_Expijt + b11Num_Coijt + b12Num_Indijt  + b13Num_Anaijt + b14Year F.E 
+b15Analysts F.E + eijt  
                        (1) 
We estimate this model for both the first forecast and last forecast the analyst makes for firm 
j at time t. If employer forecasts are relatively more biased than non-employer forecasts then 
we would expect	"# to be significantly different from zero. Under hypothesis 1 we expect "# 
to be positive and significant for the first forecast and negative and significant for the last 
forecast. Equation (1) includes a number of control variables proposed in the prior literature 
that are also likely to be related to forecast bias. The first controls for the predictability of 
earnings, Das et al. (1998) argues that when earnings are less predictable, analysts have 
stronger incentives to issue optimistic forecasts to facilitate information acquisition from 
management. We use earnings dispersion (Earn_Std) to measure earnings uncertainty 
(Barron et al., 1998; Gu and Wu, 2003). Similar to other studies (Gu and Wu, 2003, Clement, 
1999; Clement and Tse, 2005, Bradshaw, 2011) we also control for firm size (Ln(MV)), book 
to market (Ln(BTM)), and analyst following (Ln(Follow)); along with a number of forecast 
specific control variables: forecast horizon (F_Horizon), days elapsed (dayElap) and forecast 
frequency (fr).  Consistent with Clement (1999) and Hong and Kubik (2003) we also control 
for analyst specific experience (Firm_Exp - the number of years the analysts has forecasted 
firm j); general experience (Gen_Exp - number of years the analysts had been forecasting), 
along with proxies for analysts’ portfolio complexity - the number of firms (Num_Co) and 
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industries (Num_Ind) the analyst follows during time t; also we include the brokerage house 
size (Num_Ana) as well as year fixed effects (Year F.E.) and analysts fixed effects (Analysts 
F.E.). When the dependent variable is Rel_DFB, the analyst or forecast-level independent 
variables are adjusted by their related firm-year means to properly control for firm-year 
effects (Clement, 1999). To mitigate the influence of outliers and improve the explanatory 
power of the Rel_DFB model, which tends to be low because firm-specific drivers of forecast 
error are removed from the analyst forecast (Clement, 1999; Cowen et al, 2006) we winsorize 
at the bottom and top 5%. All our results are qualitatively unchanged if we winsorize at the 
1% level with the only difference being that the explanatory power of the model decreases. 
The appendix provides details on the measurement of each of these variables. Robust 
standard errors are clustered at the analyst level. 
To examine the effects of the Global Settlement and test hypothesis 2 we modify 
equation (1) by including an interaction term EMPLOYER*POST, where POST is an 
indicator variable which takes the value of one if the forecast is after the Global Settlement 
e.g. 2004-2006; and zero if the forecast is before the settlement e.g. 1999-2002. We exclude 
the year the Global Settlement was implemented thereby removing any possibility of 
differing effects in that year due to different timings of the analyst forecasts. Under 
hypothesis 2, if employer forecasts are relatively more biased than non-employers forecasts 
following the Global Settlement then we would expect the coefficient on the interaction term 
to be significantly different from zero. Specifically, we expect the coefficient to be positive 
and significant for the first forecast and negative and significant for the last forecast.   
 
3.5. Modeling forecast bias and job separation  
 
3.5.1. The sample 
 
To investigate the impact of forecast bias on job separation we obtain a sample of all analysts 
who moved brokerage houses during 1999-2006. Consistent, with our prior analysis we 
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exclude those analysts from top brokerage houses. This results in a sample of 468 unique 
analysts from medium and small brokerage houses who moved employers. Unlike our prior 
sample we do not need to restrict this sample to those analysts that forecast both employers 
and non-employers, thus this movement sample also includes analysts who may only forecast 
employers or analysts who may only forecast non-employers.  
 
3.5.2. Modeling forecast bias and job separation 
 
We estimate the following ordinal logit specification to test hypothesis 3: 
Move_statust+1 = b1 BIASijt + b2EMPLOYER + b3 BIASijt * EMPLOYER + b4Gen_Expit + 
b5Num_Coit + b6Accuracyit +b7Status F.E. +	b8Year F.E + eijt  
 (2) 
Move_status takes a discrete value of -1, 0, 1, or 2, depending on whether the analyst has 
moved that year to a higher or lower status house and the size of the jump made. For 
example, analyst i, who moves up to a higher status brokerage house (i.e. is promoted) in year 
t, is given the value of 1 if it involves one movement up the hierarchy of brokerage house 
status (i.e. low status to middle status or middle status to high status) and the value of 2 if the 
move up represents a move of two hierarches (i.e. low status to high status). Analyst i, who 
moves down to a lower status brokerage house in year t, is given the value of -1 if it involves 
one movement down the hierarchy of brokerage house status (i.e. middle status to low status). 
Because we limit our sample to those analysts moving from medium-status and low-status 
brokerage houses the maximum drop in hierarchy possible is -1 (medium to low). 
Move_status equals 0 if analyst i moves within the same hierarchy status. Consistent with 
Hong and Kubik (2003) we do not classify a status movement for the analyst if it is only the 
brokerage house that changes status during the year since the analyst has not experienced a 
job separation and we also exclude brokerage houses which merged during the year.   
We follow a similar methodology to that of Hong and Kubik (2003) and measure a 
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relative forecast bias for each firm the analyst forecasts in each year (Rel_DFB) (i.e. relative 
to the average bias of analysts from top brokerage houses) and then average across the stocks 
that the analysts from top brokerage houses covers. This produces a bias measure for analyst i 
in year t. However, this relative bias measure will be noisy for analysts that only follow a few 
firms in a year. Therefore, consistent with Hong and Kubik (2003) we create the measure 
Rel_BIAS that is the average of the analyst’s forecast biases in year t and the two previous 
years. As noted by Hong and Kubik (2003) such a long averaging period increases the signal-
to-noise ratio of the measure. For those analysts that forecasted both employers and non-
employers we measure separate Rel_BIAS for their employers’ forecasts and their non-
employer forecasts.8 Whereas those analysts that covered only non-employers, the Rel_BIAS 
measure is based on all firms covered.9 We also construct Abs_BIAS in a similar manner. 
 In addition, we control for general experience in terms of number of years the analyst 
has been forecasting for (Gen_Exp), the number of firms the analysts follows during the three 
year window (Num_Co) and whether the analysts is in the top decile of forecast accuracy 
during the same period (Accuracy). Additionally, we also include indicator variables for the 
status of the brokerage house the analyst currently works for (Status F.E.), as well as year 
fixed effects (Year F.E.).  
We estimate our model for both the first and last forecast the analyst makes for firms j 
at time t. If the forecast bias for employers is more important for job separation relative to a 
non-employers forecast then we would expect	"$ to be significantly different from zero.  
 
4. Descriptive statistics 
 
																																								 																				
8 The results are not sensitive to excluding the non-employer forecasts for those analysts forecasting both employer and non-
employer. 
9 Since we are unable to identify the brokerage house name that an analyst works for (as we do not have access to Broker 
Transaction file) we are unable to directly link an analyst who moved to a particular investment bank that she had previously 
covered. Given we argue that biased forecasts help the analysts build relationships with prospective employers then a 
banking analysts will always provide more biased forecast irrespective of whether they ultimately work for a specific 
investment bank they cover.  
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We report descriptive statistics in Table 1. Panel A shows the distributions of the forecast 
bias (Rel_DFB and Abs_DFB) for the full sample, employer sample and non-employer 
sample. Preliminary investigation of the differences between the employer forecast bias and 
non-employer forecast bias reveals that for relative bias (Rel_DFB), employer first forecast is 
significantly more optimistic than non-employer, and the employer last forecast is 
significantly more pessimistic than non-employer. The absolute bias (Abs_DFB) provides a 
consistent picture with respect to the first forecast but a different one with respect to the last 
forecast as we find this forecast is significantly more optimistic for employer versus non-
employer. Panel B shows the distribution of the firm and analyst characteristics for the 
relative and absolute bias analysis, based on the first forecast sample. The distributions are 
similar to prior studies (Clement and Tse, 2005).  
 We report correlations among the analysts’ forecast bias and analyst forecast and firm 
characteristics in Panel C. Below (above) the diagonal we report correlations for the last 
(first) forecast sample. EMPLOYER is positive and significantly correlated to bias for the first 
forecast and negatively but not significantly correlated to bias for the last forecast. 
EMPLOYER is also significantly correlated to a number of firm and standardized analyst 
characteristics, specifically a positive correlation is noted for firm size (Ln(MV)), book-to-
market (Ln(BTM)), analysts following (Ln(Follow)) and number of industries followed 
(Num_Ind); a negative correlation is noted for earnings dispersion (Earn_Std), analysts 
general experience (Gen_Exp) and number of companies followed (Num_Co). Consistent 
with prior research we find the firm characteristics of earnings dispersion and analysts 
following to be significantly correlated to forecast bias. The correlations among forecast 
characteristics and forecast bias are not significant, except for forecast horizon and forecast 
revisions. All the analyst characteristics are significantly correlated with the first forecast 
bias, but not the last forecast bias.  
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5. Results  
 
5.1. Forecast bias for employers versus non-employers 
 
Table 2 Panel A presents estimates of equation (1) where the dependent variable is relative 
forecast bias (Rel_DFB) in columns (1) and (2) and absolute bias (Abs_DFB) in columns (3) 
and (4), for the analyst’s first or last forecast. The coefficient on the indicator variable 
EMPLOYER for both the first forecast (column 1) and last forecast (column 2) is 
economically and statistically significant. The estimated coefficients on EMPLOYER reflect 
the incremental effect of optimism (pessimism) for a banking analyst that forecast a firm that 
is a potential employer in the future. Since the relative forecast bias is scaled by the average 
forecast bias of top analysts for this stock then the estimated coefficient can be interpreted in 
percentage terms of the average forecast bias of top analysts. Specifically, the coefficient on 
EMPLOYER for the first forecast is positive, indicating an optimistic forecast, and significant 
at the five percent level. The size of the EMPLOYER coefficient indicates that the average 
relative first forecast bias for employers is 9% more optimistic than for non-employers. In 
contrast, for the last forecast the coefficient on EMPLOYER is negative, indicating a 
pessimistic forecast, and is significant at the ten percent level. The size of the EMPLOYER 
coefficient indicates that the average relative last forecast bias for employers is 22.6% more 
pessimistic than for non-employers. These results provide support for hypothesis 1 that 
analysts are more biased with respect to employer forecasts than non-employer forecasts and 
that this bias follows an optimistic to pessimistic pattern. The alternative bias measure, 
Abs_Bias (column 3 and 4), provides a similar pattern to Rel_Bias. The first forecast bias for 
employers is 10.4% more optimistic and significant at the one percent level. Whilst the last 
forecast bias for employers is 17.9% more pessimistic and significant at the one percent level.  
These findings are consistent with our argument that analysts who forecast earnings of 
both employers and non-employers will have stronger career incentives influencing their 
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employer forecast. To rule out differences in task difficulty as an alternative explanation 
driving our results, in unreported results, we calculate two forecast accuracy measures. The 
first is a relative forecast accuracy measure, similar to Clement and Tse (2003), where analyst 
i’s forecast accuracy for firm j in year t is calculated as the maximum absolute forecast error 
for top analysts who follow firm j in year t minus the absolute forecast error of analyst i 
following firm j in year t, with this difference scaled by the range of absolute forecast errors 






AFEijt= Forecast EPSijt-Actual EPSijt  
 
The second forecast accuracy measure is the absolute of Abs_DFB multiplied by minus one. 
The exact calculation is: 
Forecast Accuracyijt=	-1*	 ()*_,-.*100  
 
We find for the relative forecast accuracy measure the analysts’ first employer 
forecast is significantly more accurate than their first non-employer forecast. In contrast, the 
last employer forecast is not significantly different to the last non-employer forecast. We find 
no significant difference between employer and non-employer for the absolute forecast 
accuracy.  Thus, the optimism we observe for the first employer forecast cannot be attributed 
to the difficulty of the task (Bradshaw et al., 2016).  
 Among the standardized control variables in columns (1) and (2) the coefficient 
estimates for number of analysts covering the firm (Ln(Follow)) and forecast horizon 
(F_Horizon) are positive and significantly different from zero for both the first and last 
forecast analysis; consistent with Das et al. (1998) and Cowen et al. (2006). In addition, for 
the last forecast analysis, firm-size (Ln(MV)) and number of industries followed by the 
analyst (Num_Ind), is negative and significantly different from zero; consistent with Lim 
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(2001) and Clement (1999). While the estimated coefficients on days elapsed (dayElap) and 
analyst firm-specific experience (Firm_Exp) are significantly negative consistent with Cowen 
et al. (2006).  
5.1.1. Only banks 
We test the sensitivity of these results to alternative samples. First, from our main sample, we 
focus only on analysts with forecasts for banks with and without investment arms (mainly 
commercial banks therefore excluding other financial institutions). Certainly, these latter 
firms operate in a more similar setting and therefore have more similar risks and regulations 
compared to firms that provide non-financial services. The results are reported in Table 2 
Panel B. We find, for both measures of bias, a similar pattern. EMPLOYER is positive and 
significant, with a coefficient of 0.09, for the first forecast when bias is Rel_Bias (Column 1) 
and negative and significant, with a coefficient of -0.236, for the last forecast (Column 2). 
For the Abs_Bias the EMPLOYER is positive and significant, with a coefficient of 0.107 
(Colum 3) and negative and significant, with a coefficient of -0.272, for the last forecast 
(Column 4). The results are therefore not sensitive to this alternative sample.  
However, given that the same analyst i might not forecast the same firm j in both the 
first and last forecast samples this raises an issue as to whether the coefficient on 
EMPLOYER might be different across first and last forecasts due to differences in the 
analyst-firm pair in the sample. To accommodate for this possibility, we pool the 
observations across both first and last forecast and include both analyst and firm fixed effects. 
We include an interaction term between EMPLOYER and LAST (which is an indicator 
variable equal to one for the last forecast, and zero for the first forecast). Our expectation is 
that the estimated coefficient on the interaction term will be negative and significant. We find 
strong evidence of this across both relative and absolute forecast bias. The results are 
reported in Table 2 Panel C.  
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5.1.2. Propensity score matching for employers and non-employers  
We employ propensity score matching (PSM) and use a one-to-one matched pair design to 
identify for each analyst an employer and a non-employer. Our matching algorithm uses 
variables typically related to analyst forecast bias and firm-specific variables highlighted in 
the banking literature (Flannery et al., 2004; Anolli et al., 2014). Specifically, we match on a 
number of firm characteristics, book-to-market (BTM), size (MV), bid-ask spread (Qspread), 
stock turnover (Turnover), stock return volatility (Total Risk), insolvency risk (Zscore), 
number of analysts following the firm (Follow) and the firm-specific experience of the 
analyst following the firm (Firm_Exp). We also investigate the sensitivity of our results by 
creating a sub-sample of banks with and without equity departments. For this sub-sample we 
match on all variables noted above along with one additional firm-specific variable, return-
on-assets (ROA). We include this additional variable given the accounting is similar for this 
sub-sample of firms, unlike for the full sample. 
Table 3 (Panels A and B) reports the mean difference in covariate values for first and 
last forecast using the full sample and the banking sub-sample respectively. We assess the 
balance with reference to the bias reduction and t-test (columns 7 and 8). As Oakes and 
Kaufman (2006) suggests, after matching a standardized bias below 10% is desirable. Both 
panels reveal the impact of the matching process. In Panel A (full sample), other than 
Firm_Exp and Qspread (and BTM for first forecast sample), all covariate mean differences 
pre-matching are statistically significant (consistent with the correlations noted above) but 
after matching for the first forecast sample BTM, Ln(Follow) and Turnover differ 
significantly, and for the last forecast sample Ln(Follow) and Total Risk continue to differ, 
although all of the residual biases are below 10%. The bank sub-sample, Panel B, provides a 
similar picture with the majority of covariate means being significantly different pre-match 
(for both first and last forecast samples) and only a few covariate means differing 
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significantly after the match. All the residual biases are below 10%, with the exception of 
Ln(Follow) and Total Risk. 
Panel C reports the regression estimates using the matched samples for the full 
sample. Consistent with the prior results, using either Rel_DFB or Abs_DFB the variable of 
interest EMPLOYER is positive and significantly different for the first forecast at the 1% 
level (columns 1 and 3) and negative and significantly different for the second forecast at 5% 
level (columns 2 and 4).  The size of the EMPLOYER coefficient (column (1)) indicates that 
the average relative first forecast bias for employers is 17.1% more optimistic than for non-
employers and the last forecast bias is 78.8% more pessimistic than for non-employers 
(column (2)). Although this difference might seem too large, it is actually just four cents on a 
dollar. Similarly, for the banking sub-sample (Table 3, Panel D) the first forecast is positive 
and significant at the 1% (for both the relative and absolute forecast biases) and negative and 
significant at the 10% and 5% for the last relative forecast bias and absolute forecast bias 
respectively. 
5.1.3. Non-linear controls 
Lastly we test the sensitivity of the results by controlling for firm-specific and analyst’s 
specific characteristics in non-parametric analysis. We recast all the control variables as 
indicator variables according to the quintile in which the value of the variables falls in. For 
example, instead of controlling for firm specific experience using a linear variable, we 
include four indicator variables as controls. In untabulated analysis, we find results consistent 
with the prior findings. Therefore, the results are not sensitive to this alternative specification. 
5.1.4. Global Settlement 
Table 4 presents the results of the impact of the Global Settlement on analyst career concerns 
and hence their forecast bias. Columns (1) and (2) report the results for the first and last 
forecasts respectively. We find the coefficient on the interaction term EMPLOYER*POST in 
	 24	
column (1) to be positive and significant at the five percent level. This coefficient indicates 
that post Global Settlement analysts’ first forecast for employers is 16.8% more optimistic 
than pre-settlement. In contrast, we find EMPLOYER*POST in column (2) to be negative and 
significant at the ten percent level, thus indicating that following the Global Settlement 
employers analysts’ last forecast is 15.5% more pessimistic than pre-settlement. These 
findings are consistent with the Global Settlement increasing analyst incentives to bias their 
forecast and as a result provide an even steeper walk-down to beatable earnings. 
However, reduced competition due to brokerage house closures following the Global 
Settlement, could explain our results (Hong and Kacperczyk, 2010). Therefore, we re-run the 
model, but exclude from the pre and post sample those firms who experienced a decrease in 
analysts’ coverage following the Settlement. This new sample thereby reduces the possibility 
of the competition effect, noted by Hong and Kacperczyk (2010), influencing our results. The 
results are reported in Table 4 Panel B. We find similar results to those of the main sample 
(Table 4 Panel A).  
Overall, the results suggest that the exacerbation of career concerns dominates any 
decrease in bias from potentially mitigating other conflicts of interest, consistent with the 
intention of the Settlement. 
 
5.2. Forecast bias and job separation 
 
Table 5, Panel A reports the percentage of analysts who work in high-status, medium-status 
and low-status brokerage houses. Consistent with Hong and Kubik (2003) we find 
approximately 31.5% of analysts worked in high-status brokerage houses each year. High-
status brokerage houses in aggregate should not employ the majority of analysts; otherwise 
there would be little meaning to being considered working in a prestigious house. Table 5 
Panel B reports the summary statistics of those analysts in the I/B/E/S database who leave 
their brokerage house but stay in the profession. About 6% of analysts change brokerage 
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houses each year, during 1999-2006. Of these movers approximately 7% are analysts who 
cover employers (column 2). As a fraction of these movers, about 51% move up the 
hierarchy, about 30% move down the hierarchy and the remaining are lateral movers. These 
percentages are similar to the all analyst sample (Column 1). 
 Taking a slightly different look at these job separation patterns of analysts forecasting 
employers, on average during our period, approximately 16% of bank analysts moved from 
either high-status or low-status brokerage houses. The biggest movers are from mid-status 
houses where nearly 68% of bank analysts moved. Again, these percentages are similar to the 
all analyst sample. 
 Table 5 Panels C and D presents the results of estimations from the ordinal logit 
model, equation (2), for the various job separation measures involving movements along the 
brokerage house hierarchy. In Panel C, column (1), the Rel_BIAS relates to the first forecast 
bias, in column (3) it relates to the last forecast bias. We find the first forecast bias is not 
associated with job separation along the brokerage house hierarchy, and that analysts who 
forecast employers do not experience significantly different job separations from other 
analysts, since the coefficient on the interaction variable (Rel_BIAS*EMPLOYER) is not 
significantly different from zero. However, we find the last forecast bias (column 3) for 
analysts who forecast employers is associated with job separation along the brokerage 
hierarchy. Specifically, the coefficient on the interaction variable (Rel_BIAS*EMPLOYER) is 
negative, indicating that analysts who issue pessimistic forecasts for employers are relatively 
more likely to move up the brokerage hierarchy, compared to analysts who forecast non-
employers. This result supports our hypothesis that analysts who bias their last employer 
forecasts downwards are more likely to experience favorable job separations. Panel D 
presents results using Abs_BIAS and again we find consistent results. 
 Given that interaction terms do not have a straightforward interpretation in nonlinear 
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models as they do in linear models, we follow Ai and Norton (2003) and estimate marginal 
effects for different cells. Moreover, we report odds ratios for all estimated coefficients 
(columns 2 and 4). We note that no odds ratios can be calculated for the interaction effect but 
rather we report the ratio of the odds ratio for the interaction effect. Figure 1 shows the 
marginal effect for a unit change in bias for movements up or down the hierarchy based on 
whether the analyst makes forecasts for an employer or non-employer. For non-employers, 
bias does not affect movements. For non-employers, the marginal effect is 0.09% (z-
stat=0.26) for downward movement and -0.25% (z-stat=-0.26) for upward movement as an 
analyst’s bias increases. In contrast, for employers, the marginal effect is 1.51% (z-stat=-
2.63) for downward movement and 7.28% (z-stat=2.07) for upward movement as an analyst’s 
bias increases. Therefore, more biased analyst forecasts for employers are significantly more 
likely to be associated with promotions to higher reputation banks. 
 
6. Conclusion 
This paper investigates how career concerns of analysts that forecast the performance of 
potential future employers influence their forecasts. We find evidence of a walk-down to 
beatable earnings when forecasting earnings of future employers but not of companies that 
are unlikely to be future employers. Moreover, this pattern is more pronounced after the 
Global Settlement which likely exacerbated career concerns of analysts by limiting their 
outside opportunities. Consistent with career concerns about future employment biasing 
forecasts we find that bias in potential future employers’ forecasts lead to favorable career 
outcomes. No such effect is found for bias in non-employer forecasts.  
 Our paper documents a source of conflict of interest for research analysts that is 
widely discussed in other settings, such as auditing but also more recently for other 
information intermediaries, such as credit rating analysts. Our findings open up opportunities 
for future research. Do investors recognize this source of bias when they incorporate analyst 
	 27	
earnings forecasts in market prices? Do bias incentives from revolving doors generalize to 
investment recommendations? How bias in banking analyst forecasts has contributed to 
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Figure 1 shows marginal effects of a unit change in bias for movement upwards or downwards in bank 
reputation calculated from a probit regression. It separates the effect based on whether analysts forecast earnings 
of employers or non-employers. Employer is any financial institution with a sell-side equity department where 
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Appendix: Variable Definitions 
 
Name  Description 
Rel_DFBijt = The difference between the forecast error for analyst i for firm j at time t and the average forecast error of analysts from top 
brokerage houses following firm j at time t, scaled by the mean absolute forecast error of top analysts for firm j at time t. 
Forecast error is estimated value for analyst i minus actual value of firm j at time t. 
Abs_DFBijt  The absolute forecast bias for firm j at time t is based on the signed forecast error as a percentage of share price. 
EMPLOYER = An indicator variable which takes the value of one if the forecast is for a company with a sell-side equity department (investment 
bank) and zero otherwise. 
Earn_Stdjt = Standard deviation of firm j’s prior 5 years earning in year t. 
Ln(MVjt) = Natural log of the firm j’s market value at the end of year t. 
Ln(BTMjt) = Natural log of the ratio of book value of equity to market value of firm j at the end of year t. 




The measure of the time from the forecast date to the end of the fiscal period, calculated as the forecast horizon (days from the 
forecast date to the fiscal year-end) for analyst i following firm j in year t. When we use (Rel_DFBijt) as dependent variable we 
rescale by subtracting the average forecast horizon for analysts from top brokerage houses who follow firm j in year t, with this 
difference scaled by the average forecast horizons for analysts from top brokerage houses following firm j in year t. 
dayElapijt 
= The measure of the days elapsed since the last forecast by an analyst following firm j in year t. When we use (Rel_DFBijt) as 
dependent variable we rescale by calculating it as the days between analysts i’s forecast of firm j’s earnings in year t and the 
most recent preceding forecast of firm j’s earnings by analysts from top brokerage houses, minus the average number of days 
between two adjacent forecasts of firm j’s earnings by any two analysts in year t, with this difference scaled by the average days 
between two adjacent forecasts of firm j’s earnings in year t. 
frijt 
=  The measure of analyst i’s forecast frequency for firm j, calculated as the number of firm j forecasts made by analyst i following 
firm j in year t. When we use (Rel_DFBijt) as dependent variable we rescale by subtracting the average number of firm j forecasts 
for analysts from top brokerage houses following firm j in year t, with this difference scaled by the average number of firm j 
forecasts issued by analysts from top brokerage houses following firm j in year t. 
Firm_Expijt 
= The measure of analyst i’s firm-specific experience, calculated as the number of years of firm-specific experience for analyst i 
following firm j in year t.  When we use (Rel_DFBijt) as dependent variable we rescale by subtracting the average number of 
years of firm-specific experience for analysts from top brokerage houses following firm j in year i, with this difference scaled by 
the average years of firm-specific experience for analysts from top brokerage houses following firm j in year t. 
Gen_Expijt 
= The measure of analyst i's general experience, calculated as the number of years of experience for analyst i following firm j in 
year t. When we use (Rel_DFBijt) as dependent variable we rescale by subtracting the average number of years of experience for 
analysts from top brokerage houses following firm j in year t, with this difference scaled by the range of years of experience for 
analysts from top brokerage houses following firm j in year t. 
Num_Coijt 
= The measure of the number of companies analyst i follows in year t, calculated as the number of companies followed by analyst i 
following firm j in year t. When we use (Rel_DFBijt) as dependent variable we rescale by subtracting the average number of 
companies followed by analysts from top brokerage houses who follow firm j in year t, with this difference scaled by the average 
number of companies followed by analysts from top brokerage houses following firm j in year t. 
Num_Indijt = The measure of number of industries analyst i follows in year t, calculated as the number of two-digit SICs followed by analyst i 
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following firm j in year t. When we use (Rel_DFBijt) as dependent variable we rescale by subtracting the average number of two-
digit SICs followed by analysts from top brokerage houses who follow firm j in year t, with this difference scaled by the average 
number of two-digit SICs followed by analysts from top brokerage houses following firm j in year t. 
Num_Anaijt 
= The measure of the analyst’s brokerage size, calculated as the number of analysts employed by the brokerage house employing 
analyst i following firm j in year t. When we use (Rel_DFBijt) as dependent variable we rescale by subtracting the average 
number of analysts employed by brokerage houses for analysts following firm j in year t, with this difference scaled by the 
average brokerage house size for analysts following firm j in year t. 
Qspreadjt = The measure of a firms bid-ask spread is the average quoted spread of firm j in effect for transactions during the year ending at t. 
Turnoverjt = The measure of a firm’s turnover is the number of shares traded in firm j, divided by the number of shares outstanding at the end 
of the preceding year, time t–1.  
Totalriskjt = The measure of total risk is estimated as the standard deviation of firm j of monthly returns (computed on a daily basis).  
zscorejt 
= A proxy for insolvency risk of firm j at the end of year t. A function of net income, total equity and standard deviation of ROA. 
See Anolli, et al., 2014, Boyd et al., 1993; Laeven and Levine, 2009. By construction higher values of the Z-score imply lower 
levels of risk.  
ROAjt = The measure of return on asset for firm j in year t is the net accounting income after taxes divided by total assets. 
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Table 1 
Descriptive statistics on analyst and firm characteristics 
This table reports descriptive statistics for analysts forecast observations from 1999-2006. Analysts and forecast characteristics are derived from detailed I/B/E/S data. Our 
sample is analysts that cover both banks and non-banks. We restrict the sample to forecasts issued no earlier than 1 year and no later than 30 days before the fiscal-year 
end. The firm characteristics are Earn_Std, earnings dispersion; MV, the market capitalization; BTM, the book to market and Follow, the number of analysts covering the 
firm. The analyst characteristics are F_Horizon, the number of days from the forecast date to the fiscal year-end; dayElap, the number of days since any analyst’s prior 
forecast; fr, forecast frequency; Firm_Exp, the analyst’s years of experience forecasting a particular firm’s earnings; Gen_Exp, the analyst’s overall years of forecasting 
experience;  Num_Co, the number of companies the analyst follows in each year; Num_Ind, the number of two-digit SIC industries the analyst follows in each year, and 
Num_Ana, the number of analysts in the analyst’s brokerage house each year. Panel A reports the descriptive statistics of the relative forecast bias (Rel_DFB for first and 
last forecast) and the absolute forecast bias (Abs_DFB for first and last forecast) for the full sample and separately for the sample of employers and non-employers. Panel 
B reports both the descriptive statistics for relative control variables and absolute control variables based on the first forecast sample. Panel C reports correlations among 
scaled characteristics. Below the diagonal we present correlations for the last forecast bias (Rel_DFB) and above the diagonal we present the correlations for the first 
forecast bias (Rel_DFB) all variables are adjusted for firm-year effects where necessary. The p-values are reported below the correlations in parentheses. All variable 
definitions are as reported in the Appendix above. 
 
Panel A: Dependent Variable 
 
Full Sample Employer Non-Employer  
Variable n Mean S.D. 25th Q Median 75th Q n Mean S.D. n Mean S.D. Difference (t-test) 
Dependent Variable              
Rel_DFB (first forecast) 3652 -0.07 1.01 -0.50 0.00 0.37 1860 -0.02 1.06 1792 -0.11 0.95 0.09 (2.76***) 
Rel_DFB (last forecast) 3225 0.01 2.12 -1.00 -0.20 0.60 1581 -0.06 2.17 1644 0.08 2.07 -0.14 (1.84*) 
              
Abs_DFB (first forecast) 3778 0.24 1.45 -0.23 -0.02 0.29 1943 0.32 1.60 1835 0.16 1.27 0.16 (3.29***) 





















Panel B: Independent Variables 
 Full Sample Employer Non-Employer 
Variable n Mean S.D. 25th Q Median 75th Q n Mean S.D. n Mean S.D. 
Variables for the Rel_DFB analysis:           
Earn_Std 3652 0.07 0.04 0.05 0.07 0.10 1860 0.07 0.03 1792 0.08 0.04 
Ln(MV) 3652 9.73 0.97 8.95 9.65 10.49 1860 10.00 1.00 1792 9.45 0.84 
Ln(BTM) 3652 -0.90 0.42 -1.15 -0.82 -0.59 1860 -0.88 0.41 1792 -0.92 0.43 
Ln(Follow) 3652 3.16 0.27 3.00 3.22 3.33 1860 3.19 0.28 1792 3.12 0.25 
F_Horizon 3652 0.01 0.25 -0.13 0.04 0.18 1860 0.02 0.25 1792 0.01 0.25 
dayElap 3652 0.58 2.87 -1.00 -0.82 0.50 1860 0.57 2.83 1792 0.60 2.92 
fr 3652 -0.05 0.37 -0.33 -0.10 0.20 1860 -0.05 0.37 1792 -0.04 0.37 
Firm_Exp 3652 0.02 0.79 -0.59 -0.20 0.36 1860 0.04 0.81 1792 0.01 0.77 
Gen_Exp 3652 0.05 0.68 -0.49 -0.13 0.48 1860 0.02 0.65 1792 0.09 0.70 
Num_Co 3652 0.22 0.57 -0.20 0.08 0.49 1860 0.20 0.55 1792 0.25 0.59 
Num_Ind 3652 0.39 0.74 -0.14 0.00 0.78 1860 0.41 0.77 1792 0.36 0.71 
Num_Ana 3652 -0.75 0.15 -0.88 -0.79 -0.64 1860 -0.76 0.15 1792 -0.75 0.16 
             
Variables for the Abs_DFB analysis:           
Earn_Std 3778 0.08 0.04 0.05 0.07 0.10 1943 0.07 0.04 1835 0.08 0.05 
Ln(MV) 3778 9.69 1.06 8.94 9.64 10.44 1943 9.97 1.13 1835 9.41 0.89 
Ln(BTM) 3778 -0.91 0.50 -1.15 -0.82 -0.59 1943 -0.90 0.47 1835 -0.93 0.54 
Ln(Follow) 3778 3.14 0.32 3.00 3.22 3.37 1943 3.17 0.35 1835 3.11 0.28 
F_Horizon 3778 289.51 74.01 265.00 301.00 359.00 1943 289.63 75.03 1835 289.39 72.92 
dayElap 3778 5.49 9.89 0.00 1.00 6.00 1943 5.32 9.74 1835 5.67 10.05 
fr 3778 4.14 2.02 3.00 4.00 5.00 1943 4.25 2.05 1835 4.02 1.98 
Firm_Exp 3778 4.45 3.74 2.00 3.00 6.00 1943 4.37 3.65 1835 4.53 3.84 
Gen_Exp 3778 8.03 5.05 4.00 7.00 11.00 1943 7.82 4.74 1835 8.25 5.35 
Num_Co 3778 21.28 12.67 13.00 18.00 25.00 1943 20.41 11.05 1835 22.20 14.13 
Num_Ind 3778 2.25 1.50 1.00 2.00 3.00 1943 2.06 1.39 1835 2.45 1.58 
Num_Ana 3778 42.14 27.84 20.00 35.00 57.00 1943 41.40 27.52 1835 42.92 28.15 
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Rel_DFB EMPLOYER Earn_Std Ln(MV) Ln(BTM) Ln(Follow) F_Horizon dayElap fr Firm_Exp Gen_Exp Num_Co Num_Ind Num_Ana 
Rel_DFB   0.0456 0.0064 0.0217 0.0214 0.0390 0.2074 0.0061 0.1139 0.0329 0.0399 0.0319 0.0447 -0.0027 
 
 (0.006) (0.697) (0.191) (0.195) (0.018) (<0.001) (0.714) (<0.001) (0.047) (0.016) (0.054) (0.007) (0.870) 
EMPLOYER -0.0252  -0.0478 0.2835 0.0467 0.1215 0.0161 -0.0042 -0.0114 0.0196 -0.0501 -0.0451 0.0379 -0.0251 
 (0.153)  (0.004) (<0.001) (0.005) (<0.001) (0.331) (0.801) (0.508) (0.236) (0.003) (0.006) (0.022) (0.129) 
Earn_Std 0.0672 -0.0507  -0.1730 -0.1597 0.0119 0.0006 0.0247 0.0904 0.0031 0.0020 -0.0248 0.0100 0.1376 
 
(<0.001) (0.004)  (<0.001) (<0.001) (0.474) (0.971) (0.136) (<0.001) (0.853) (0.903) (0.134) (0.545) (<0.001) 
Ln(MV) -0.0259 0.3486 -0.1207  -0.0296 0.5886 -0.0328 -0.0266 -0.0943 -0.1241 -0.1591 -0.0041 -0.0043 0.0163 
 
(0.142) (<0.001) (<0.001)  (0.073) (<0.001) (0.048) (0.108) (<0.001) (<0.001) (<0.001) 0.8035 0.7929 0.3247 
Ln(BTM) -0.0251 0.0766 -0.2316 -0.0313  0.1142 -0.0127 0.0259 -0.0364 -0.0024 -0.0431 0.0245 0.0336 -0.0887 
 
(0.155) (<0.001) (<0.001) (0.075)  (<0.001) (0.444) (0.118) (0.034) (0.883) (0.009) (0.138) (0.042) (<0.001) 
Ln(Follow) 0.0318 0.2496 0.0350 0.5682 0.0867  -0.0424 -0.0224 -0.0806 -0.1092 -0.1487 -0.0309 -0.0510 0.0071 
 
(0.071) (<0.001) (0.047) (<0.001) (<0.001)  (0.010) (0.177) (<0.001) (<0.001) (<0.001) (0.062) (0.002) (0.667) 
F_Horizon 0.1310 0.0517 0.0532 0.0822 -0.0127 0.0329  -0.0263 0.4288 0.1690 0.1306 0.0634 0.0142 0.0066 
 
(<0.001) (0.003) (0.003) (<0.001) (0.471) (0.062)  (0.113) (<0.001) (<0.001) (<0.001) (<0.001) (0.391) (0.690) 
dayElap 0.0270 0.0094 0.0062 -0.0193 -0.0070 -0.0237 -0.1529  -0.0018 0.0302 0.0999 0.0306 0.0409 -0.0503 
 
(0.126) (0.593) (0.727) (0.273) (0.692) (0.178) (<0.001)  (0.294) (0.068) (<0.001) (0.064) (0.014) (0.002) 
fr 0.0965 -0.0105 0.0545 -0.0987 -0.0331 -0.0742 0.4422 -0.0552  0.0577 0.0349 0.0204 -0.0718 0.0206 
 
(<0.001) (0.547) (<0.001) (<0.001) (0.0574) (<0.001) (<0.001) (0.002)  (<0.001) (0.415) (0.235) (<0.001) (0.230) 
Firm_Exp 0.0257 0.0047 -0.0038 -0.1222 0.0063 -0.0966 0.0152 0.0900 0.0607  0.5883 0.169 0.0206 -0.0194 
 
(0.145) (0.788) (0.829) (<0.001) (0.720) (<0.001) (0.389) (<0.001) (<0.001)  (<0.001) (<0.001) (0.213) (0.242) 
Gen_Exp 0.0160 -0.056 -0.0078 -0.1504 -0.0206 -0.1393 0.0210 0.1095 0.0288 0.6185  0.2972 0.0650 0.0338 
 
(0.364) (0.002) (0.660) (<0.001) (0.242) (<0.001) (0.234) (<0.001) (0.098) (<0.001)  (<0.001) (<0.001) (0.041) 
Num_Co 0.0273 -0.0321 -0.0307 -0.0281 0.0260 -0.0594 0.0088 0.0361 0.0340 0.1728 0.2851  0.4334 -0.0434 
 
(0.122) (0.069) (0.082) (0.111) (0.140) (0.001) (0.616) (0.040) (0.052) (<0.001) (<0.001)  (<0.001) (0.009) 
Num_Ind 0.0099 0.0326 -0.0006 -0.0102 0.0353 -0.0504 0.1013 0.0168 -0.0605 0.0270 0.0539 0.3983  -0.1043 
 
(0.576) (0.065) (0.974) (0.563) (0.045) (0.004) (<0.001) (0.341) (<0.001) (0.125) (0.002) (<0.001)  (<0.001) 
Num_Ana 0.0058 -0.0256 0.1339 0.0075 -0.1294 -0.0014 -0.0038 -0.0514 0.0219 -0.0056 0.0546 -0.0168 -0.0892  
 
(0.742) (0.146) (<0.001) (0.669) (<0.001) (0.935) (0.828) (0.004) (0.210) (0.749) (0.002) (0.339) (<0.001)  
	 37	
Table 2: 
Comparing analyst forecast bias of bank-analysts first and last yearly earnings forecast 
DFBijt=b1EMPLOYER+b2Earn_Stdjt+b3Ln(MVjt)+b4Ln(BTMjt)+b5Ln(Followjt)+b6F_Horizonijt+b7dayElapijt+b8frijt+b9Firm
_Expijt+b10Gen_Expijt+b11Num_Coijt+b12Num_Indijt+b13Num_Anaijt+b14Year F.E. +b15Analysts F.E. +eijt 
Panel A: Full Sample 
Dependent Variable Rel_DFB  Abs_DFB 
 (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
 
First Forecast  
 
Last Forecast   First Forecast   Last Forecast  
EMPLOYER 0.090** 
 




(-1.73)  (2.27)  (-2.43) 
Earn_Std -0.437 
 




(1.25)  (8.60)  (6.59) 
Ln(MV) -0.008 
 




(-2.61)  (-1.00)  (-3.17) 
Ln(BTM) 0.045 
 




(-0.25)  (5.34)  (-3.98) 
Ln(Follow) 0.247*** 
 




(2.95)  (2.82)  (4.35) 
F_Horizon 0.959*** 
 




(3.76)  (1.00)  (4.76) 
dayElap 0.007 
 




(2.59)  (-0.85)  (2.09) 
fr -0.002 
 




(-0.02)  (5.52)  (-0.65) 
Firm_Exp -0.030 
 




(1.77)  (3.17)  (1.58) 
Gen_Exp 0.079 
 




(0.10)  (3.50)  (1.51) 
Num_Co 0.090 
 




(-0.49)  (-1.33)  (0.90) 
Num_Ind 0.036 
 




(-1.97)  (-0.77)  (-0.38) 
Num_Ana -0.352 
 




(0.08)  (-0.74)  (-0.04) 
Year F.E. Yes 
 
Yes  Yes  Yes 
Analysts F.E. Yes Yes  Yes  Yes 
Observations 3644 
 
3212  3772  3819 
Adjusted R2 5.40% 
 
1.70%  22.4%  25.0% 
This table reports the ordinary least squares estimation results using two alternative measures of forecast bias; relative and absolute, for 
the period 1999-2006. First forecast is the initial forecast analyst i issued for firm j in year t and last forecast is the last forecast revision 
analyst i issued for firm j in year t. Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors are clustered by analyst. t-statistics are reported in 
parentheses. *, **, and *** represent significance level of 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively (two-tailed). All variable definitions are as 
reported in the Appendix above.  
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Panel B: Banks Only Sample 
Dependent Variable Rel_DFB  Abs_DFB 
 (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
 First Forecast   Last Forecast   First Forecast   Last Forecast 
EMPLOYER 0.090**  -0.236*  0.107***  -0.272*** 
 
(2.26)  (-1.80)  (2.31)  (-3.32) 
Earn_Std -0.428  2.120  11.224***  0.430 
 
(-0.54)  (0.66)  (8.62)  (0.87) 
Ln(MV) -0.014  -0.258***  -0.011  0.305* 
 
(-0.72)  (-2.69)  (-0.34)  (1.88) 
Ln(BTM) 0.011  -0.021  0.306***  -0.654*** 
 
(0.19)  (-0.10)  (4.44)  (-3.99) 
Ln(Follow) 0.291***  1.074***  0.362***  2.089*** 
 
(2.95)  (2.74)  (2.60)  (3.24) 
F_Horizon 1.002***  0.648***  0.000  0.003** 
 
(9.56)  (4.19)  (0.81)  (2.56) 
dayElap 0.006  0.082***  -0.001  0.005* 
 
(0.81)  (2.58)  (-0.50)  (1.75) 
fr -0.001  -0.006  0.090***  0.030 
 
(-1.18)  (-1.07)  (5.13)  (0.89) 
Firm_Exp -0.044  0.144  0.027***  -0.008 
 
(-1.35)  (1.22)  (2.57)  (-0.66) 
Gen_Exp 0.084  0.201  0.416***  0.019 
 
(1.10)  (0.70)  (4.06)  (1.30) 
Num_Co 0.068  -0.138  -0.007  -0.018*** 
 
(1.06)  (-0.53)  (-1.14)  (-3.64) 
Num_Ind 0.043  -0.393***  -0.041  0.207*** 
 
(1.21)  (-2.41)  (-1.02)  (3.16) 
Num_Ana -0.251  0.521  -0.001  -0.935 
 
(-0.68)  (0.51)  (-0.33)  (-1.30) 
Year F.E. Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Analysts F.E. Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Observations 3311  2934  3412  3447 
Adjusted R2       5.7%  1.0%  24.2%  27.3% 
This table reports the ordinary least squares estimation results using two alternative measures of forecast bias; relative and absolute for 
the banking only sample 1999-2006. First forecast is the initial forecast analyst i issued for firm j in year t and last forecast is the last 
forecast revision analyst i issued for firm j in year t. Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors are clustered by analyst. t-statistics are 
reported in parentheses. *, **, and *** represent significance level of 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively (two-tailed). All variable 
definitions are as reported in the Appendix above.  
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Panel C: Pooling Observations across First and Last forecasts 
 
Dependent Variable Rel_DFB  Abs_DFB 
 (1)  (2) 
EMPLOYER * LAST -0.224***  -0.407*** 
 
(-3.41)  (-5.52)    
LAST 0.056  0.361*** 
 (0.80)  (3.85)    
Earn_Std 0.787  20.585*** 
 
(0.72)  (7.63)    
Ln(MV) 0.131  -1.213*** 
 
(1.25)  (-6.83)    
Ln(BTM) -0.018  1.465*** 
 
(-0.15)  (7.05)    
Ln(Follow) 0.601**  0.364*** 
 
(3.67)  (2.67)    
F_Horizon 0.465***  0.001*** 
 
(7.74)  (3.93)    
dayElap 0.013**  0.001    
 
(2.00)  (0.39)    
fr 0.000  0.040**  
 
(0.09)  (2.47)    
Firm_Exp 0.051  -0.002    
 
(1.50)  (-0.31)    
Gen_Exp 0.002  0.054 
 
(0.02)  (1.31)    
Num_Co 0.029  0.001    
 
(0.42)  (0.16)    
Num_Ind -0.017  -0.035    
 
(-0.38)  (-0.83)    
Num_Ana -0.124  0.002    
 
(-0.43)  (0.72)    
Year F.E. Yes  Yes 
Analyst F.E. Yes  Yes 
Firm F.E. Yes  Yes 
Observations 6853  7574 
Adjusted R2 3.6%  31.4% 
This table reports the ordinary least squares estimation results using two alternative measures of forecast bias; relative and absolute for 
the sample 1999-2006. LAST is an indicator variable equal to one for the last forecast revision analyst i issued for firm j in year t and zero 
otherwise. Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors are clustered by analyst. t-statistics are reported in parentheses. *, **, and *** 
represent significance level of 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively (two-tailed). All other variable definitions are as reported in the Appendix 
above.  
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Table 3:  
Propensity Score Matching Results 
Panel A: Effects of propensity score matching: Full sample, (Rel_DFB) 
 Unmatched Matched 
 
Employer Non-Employer   Employer Non-Employer   
Variable Mean Mean %Bias t-test Mean Mean %Bias t-test 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
First Forecast 
Market Value 34962 17632 68.20 22.10*** 24165 24468 -1.20 -0.41 
BTM 0.4667 0.4597 3.50 1.15 0.4570 0.4415 7.90 2.40** 
Follow 25.098 23.035 36.70 11.94*** 24.337 23.98 6.40 1.86* 
Firm_Exp 4.4085 4.4727 -1.90 -0.61 4.3428 4.3778 -1.00 -0.30 
Qspread 0.1391 0.1432 -2.60 -0.83 0.1422 0.1416 0.40 0.77 
Turnover 1.2922 1.4423 -18.10 -5.91*** 1.3594 1.3151 5.30 1.68* 
Total Risk 0.0698 0.0754 -16.40 -5.34*** 0.0728 0.0713 4.40 1.33 
Zscore 342.13 279.34 18.40 5.90*** 315.51 304.47 3.20 0.95 
Last Forecast 
Market Value 39946 17951 69.10 19.52*** 22558 22932 -1.20 -0.51 
BTM 0.4472 0.4338 8.00 2.28** 0.4388 0.4372 1.00 0.24 
Follow 26.342 23.601 49.80 14.14*** 25.321 24.994 5.90 1.65* 
Firm_Exp 4.4436 4.5989 -4.40 -1.26 4.3352 4.2068 3.70 0.97 
Qspread 0.1525 0.1517 0.50 0.14 0.1459 0.1554 -5.50 -1.39 
Turnover 1.148 1.273 -19.00 -5.40*** 1.2262 1.2302 -0.60 -0.16 
Total Risk 0.0706 0.0770 -16.60 -4.71*** 0.0753 0.0723 7.80 2.02** 






Panel B: Effects of propensity score matching: Bank only sample (Rel_DFB) 
 Unmatched Matched 
 
Employer Non-Employer %Bias t-test Employer Non-Employer %Bias t-test 
Variable Mean Mean %Bias t-test Mean Mean %Bias t-test 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
First Forecast 
Market Value 35204 17982 67.40 19.85*** 22299 22545 -1.00 -0.36 
BTM 0.4677 0.4514 8.60 2.62*** 0.4558 0.4467 4.90 1.43 
Follow 25.378 23.617 32.40 9.77*** 24.569 23.952 11.40 3.28*** 
Firm_Exp 4.4924 4.1989 8.70 2.64*** 4.3983 4.4651 -2.00 -0.56 
Qspread 0.1382 0.1441 -3.60 -1.09 0.1435 0.1376 3.60 1.03 
Turnover 1.2476 1.4307 -22.50 -6.89*** 1.3125 1.2806 3.90 1.21 
Total Risk 0.0684 0.0748 -18.60 -5.68*** 0.0721 0.0671 14.70 4.49*** 
Zscore 351.66 304.91 13.00 3.93*** 329.44 332.21 -0.80 -0.22 
ROA 0.0180 0.0250 -26.80 -8.24*** 0.0185 0.0203 -6.80 -2.19** 
Last Forecast 
Market Value 38086 18520 60.00 16.33*** 21452 21186 0.80 0.38 
BTM 0.4432 0.440 1.60 0.47 0.4289 0.4252 2.60 0.62 
Follow 25.768 23.981 29.70 8.30*** 24.753 24.049 11.70 3.12*** 
Firm_Exp 4.607 4.335 7.40 2.07** 4.4763 4.6926 -5.90 -1.52 
Qspread 0.1689 0.1963 -8.90 -2.55** 0.1741 0.1650 2.90 1.08 
Turnover 1.1503 1.3475 -21.90 -6.26*** 1.2198 1.1939 2.90 0.38 
Total Risk 0.0707 0.0807 -22.30 -6.41*** 0.0751 0.0722 6.60 1.98** 
Zscore 444.80 382.58 10.50 2.94*** 423.36 415.60 1.40 0.34 
ROA 0.0211 0.0258 -11.80 -3.30*** 0.0230 0.0245 -4.00 -0.99 
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Panel C: Full Sample 
DFBijt=b1EMPLOYER+b2Earn_Stdjt+b3Ln(MVjt)+b4Ln(BTMjt)+b5Ln(Followjt)+b6F_Horizonijt+b7dayElapijt+b8frijt+b9Firm
_Expijt+b10Gen_Expijt+b11Num_Coijt+b12Num_Indijt+b13Num_Anaijt+b14Year F.E.+b15Analyst F.E. + eijt 
 
Dependent Variable Rel_DFB  Abs_DFB 
 (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
 First Forecast   Last Forecast   
First Forecast   Last Forecast 
EMPLOYER 0.171*** 
 




(-2.07)  (3.08)  (-2.48) 
Earn_Std -1.246 
 




(1.65)  (4.77)  (5.25) 
Ln(MV) -0.030 
 




(-2.70)  (2.37)  (-4.13) 
Ln(BTM) 0.002 
 




(-0.06)  (3.85)  (4.70) 
Ln(Follow) 0.194 
 




(1.75)  (0.97)  (4.15) 
F_Horizon 1.101*** 
 




(3.67)  (0.16)  (3.30) 
dayElap 0.018** 
 




(2.95)  (-1.32)  (1.12) 
fr -0.002* 
 




(0.75)  (5.49)  (-0.96) 
Firm_Exp -0.058 
 




(1.07)  (1.19)  (0.39) 
Gen_Exp 0.087 
 




(-0.33)  (1.38)  (-0.84) 
Num_Co 0.088 
 




(-0.94)  (0.21)  (-0.95) 
Num_Ind 0.000 
 




(-1.67)  (0.01)  (0.10) 
Num_Ana 0.241 
 




(1.71)  (-1.18)  (0.20) 
Year F.E. Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes Analyst F.E. Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Observations 2332  1900  2388  2426 Adjusted R2 9.90%  5.50%  23.70%  39.2% This table reports the ordinary least squares estimation results using two measure of forecast bias, relative and absolute, for the years 
1999-2006. First forecast is the initial forecast analyst i issued for firm j in year t and last forecast is the last forecast revision analyst i 
issued for firm j in year t. Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors are clustered by analyst. t-statistics are reported in parentheses. *, **, 




Panel D: Banks Only Sample 
Dependent Variable Rel_DFB  Abs_DFB 
 (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
 First Forecast   Last Forecast  First Forecast   Last Forecast 
EMPLOYER 0.119***  -0.549*  0.187***  -0.271** 
 (2.71)  (-1.88)  (3.51)  (-2.45) 
Earn_Std -0.099  7.612  4.304*  41.315*** 
 (-0.09)  (1.10)  (1.84)  (4.47) 
Ln(MV) -0.035  -0.606**  0.189***  -0.656*** 
 (-1.02)  (-2.90)  (3.40)  (-3.40) 
Ln(BTM) -0.091  0.542  0.160**  1.125*** 
 (-1.47)  (1.42)  (2.12)  (3.48) 
Ln(Follow) 0.330**  0.780  0.148  0.809*** 
 (2.44)  (1.05)  (1.14)  (2.88) 
F_Horizon 0.925***  0.829**  -0.000  0.002** 
 (7.00)  (2.42)  (-1.03)  (2.45) 
dayElap 0.006  0.260***  -0.002  0.005 
 (0.73)  (2.82)  (-0.70)  (1.09) 
fr 0.000  -0.007  0.138***  -0.059 
 (0.07)  (-0.72)  (5.98)  (-1.52) 
Firm_Exp -0.059  0.342  0.031**  0.018 
 (-1.46)  (1.45)  (2.48)  (0.62) 
Gen_Exp -0.017  -0.313  0.279**  -0.001 
 (-0.18)  (-0.64)  (2.18)  (-0.00) 
Num_Co -0.042  -0.653  -0.010  0.003 
 (-0.48)  (-1.51)  (-1.21)  (0.35) 
Num_Ind 0.058  -0.315  0.000  -0.024 
 (1.24)  (-1.05)  (0.01)  (-0.24) 
Num_Ana 0.222  1.336  -0.000  -0.004 
 (0.69)  (0.81)  (-0.15)  (-0.91) 
Year F.E. Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Analysts F.E. Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Observations 2078  1764  2136  2142 
Adjusted R2 8.1%  1.1%  23.20%  30.30% 
This table reports the ordinary least squares estimation results using two forecast bias measures: relative and absolute for a sub-sample of 
banks for the years 1999-2006. First forecast is the initial forecast analyst i issued for firm j in year t and last forecast is the last forecast 
revision analyst i issued for firm j in year t. Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors are clustered by analyst. t-statistics are reported in 
parentheses. *, **, and *** represent significance level of 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively (two-tailed). All variable definitions are as 





Panel A: Comparing analyst forecast bias of bank-analysts first and last yearly earnings forecast 
 before and after the Global Settlement 
Rel_DFBijt =  b1EMPLOYER*POST + b2EMPLOYER +b3Earn_Stdjt+ b4Ln(MVjt) +b5Ln(BTMjt) +b6Ln(Followjt) + 
b7F_Horizonijt +b8dayElapijt +b9frijt +b10Firm_Expijt + b11Gen_Expijt + b12Num_Coijt + b13Num_Indijt  + 
b14Num_Anaijt + b15Year F.E. + b16Analyst F.E. +eijt  





EMPLOYER*POST 0.168**   -0.155* 
	
(2.21)     (-1.65) 
EMPLOYER -0.039  0.051 
 (-0.73)  (0.71) 
Earn_Std -0.763     0.997 
	
(-0.904)     (1.10) 
Ln(MV) 0.033     0.008 
	
(1.18)     (0.23) 
Ln(BTM) 0.072    0.118*** 
	
(1.32)     (2.96) 
Ln(Follow) 0.051   0.320*** 
	
(0.52)     (2.92) 
F_Horizon 0.927***  0.175*** 
	
(8.31)     (4.85) 
dayElap 0.002  -0.000 
	
(0.28)     (-0.05) 
fr -0.002*  -0.005*** 
	
(-1.90)     (-2.85) 
Firm_Exp -0.028     0.006 
	
(-0.97)     (0.13) 
Gen_Exp 0.053   -0.050 
	
(0.96)     (-0.88) 
Num_Co 0.092    0.003 
	
(1.40)     (0.07) 
Num_Ind 0.015   0.092* 
	
(0.39)     (1.74) 
Num_Ana -0.378     0.635 
		 (-1.16)     (-1.61) 
Year F.E. YES 	 YES 
Analysts F.E. YES 	 YES 
Observations 3476 	 3154 
Adjusted R2 3.20%      9.70% 
This table compares analyst bias before and after the Global Settlement in year 2003 using analyst constant sample from year 
1999 to 2006. Before the settlement represents years 1999 to 2002 while after the settlement represents years 2004 to 2006. The 
year of the Global Settlement is excluded. First forecast is the initial forecast analyst i issued for firm j in year t and last forecast 
is the last forecast revision analyst i issued for firm j in year t. Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors are clustered by 
company and analyst pair. t-statistics are reported in parentheses. *, **, and *** represent significance level of 10%, 5%, and 
1%, respectively. All variable definitions are as reported in the Appendix above. 
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Panel B: Sub-sample of firms that experienced no decrease in analyst coverage following the Global 
Settlement 













(1.88)    
 
(-1.62) 
EMPLOYER -0.007  0.050 
 (-0.14)  (0.67) 




(-0.90)    
 
(1.46) 




(0.79)    
 
(0.35) 




(0.96)    
 
(3.24) 











(8.17)    
 
(4.29) 











(-1.56)    
 
(-0.56) 




(-0.71)    
 
(-0.39) 




(0.81)    
 
(-0.92) 

















  (-1.05)      (-1.08) 
Year F.E. YES 
 
YES 




Adjusted R2 3.20%  9.10% 
This table compares analyst bias before and after the Global Settlement in year 2003 using analyst constant sample and excluding 
any firms that experienced a drop in analysts following after Settlement. Before the settlement represents years 1999 to 2002 
while after the settlement represents years 2004 to 2006. The year of the Global Settlement is excluded. First forecast is the 
initial forecast analyst i issued for firm j in year t and last forecast is the last forecast revision analyst i issued for firm j in year t. 
Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors are clustered by company and analyst pair. t-statistics are reported in parentheses. *, 





Brokerage House Status and Job Movement  
 
Panel A: Percentage of analysts in different status brokerage houses each year 
The table presents the percentage of all analysts in I/B/E/S who are categorized as working for  










Year Analyst% Analyst% Analyst% 
1999 27.33% 48.17% 24.49% 
2000 26.44% 51.57% 21.99% 
2001 30.62% 45.26% 24.13% 
2002 33.12% 43.88% 23.01% 
2003 33.31% 45.12% 21.57% 
2004 35.02% 43.28% 21.70% 
2005 33.95% 45.15% 20.90% 
2006 32.51% 47.58% 19.91% 
Overall (1998-2006) 31.53% 46.25% 22.21% 
 
 
Panel B: Summary statistics of analyst job movement 
This table presents the averaged percentage of all analyst and analysts who forecast potential employers in the 
I/B/E/S database who move between brokerage houses each year during 1999-2006 and the percentage who 
experience various types of job separations in a year averaged over year 1999-2006. 
 




 (1)  (2) 
% of Analysts Who Change Houses each Year:  6.05%  6.93% 
 
  
Average % of Analysts that move up each year 49.39%  51.35% 
Average % of Analysts that move down each year 30.17%  29.73% 
Average % of Analysts that stay high each year 11.32%  12.61% 
Average % of Analysts that stay low each year 9.14%  4.50% 
    % of Analysts moving from High-Status House 16.32%  16.41% 
% of Analysts moving from Low-Status House 24.61%  15.90% 





Panel C: The effect of relative forecast bias on job separations  
Move_statust+1 = b1 BIASijt + b2EMPLOYER + b3 BIASijt * EMPLOYER + b4Gen_Expijt + b5Num_Coijt +  
    b6Accuracy +b7Status F.E. +	b8Year F.E + eijt  
Dependent Variable= Move_status Relative Forecast Bias 
Variable  First Forecast  Last Forecast  
  Coefficient 
Odds Ratio 
or Ratios of 
odds ratios Coefficient 
Odds Ratio or 
Ratios of odds 
ratios 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Rel_BIAS  0.000    1.000    -0.000    1.000    
	
 (0.26)       (-0.29)     
EMPLOYER  0.915    2.496    1.366**  3.921*   
	
 (1.45)     (2.20)     
Rel_BIAS*EMPLOYER  -0.003    0.997    -0.339**  0.712*   
	
 (-0.05)     (-2.30)     
Gen_Exp  -0.029    0.971    -0.043**  0.957*   
	
 (-1.37)     (-1.97)     
Num_Co  0.040**  1.041*   0.033*   1.033    
	
 (2.35)        (1.87)     
Accuracy  -0.024    0.976    -0.127    0.881    
  (-0.09)     (-0.49)     
Status F.E.  Yes  Yes  
Year F.E.  Yes  Yes  
Observations	  568  512  
Pesudo-R2  28.40%  27.60%  
This table present estimations from the ordinal logit regression to examine if past forecast optimism from bank and non-bank 
analysts have different effect on the likelihood of analyst moves to a higher or lower status brokerage house during 1999 to 2006. 
The sample contains only those analysts from medium or low status houses. The dependant variable Move-status equals the value 
1 if the analyst in time t moves up one hierarchy of brokerage house status and the value of 2 if the move up represents a move of 
two hierarches. If the analyst moves side-ways then it takes the value of zero. If, however, the analysts moves down one 
hierarchy then it takes the value of -1. Similar with Hong and Kubik (2003), we measure the forecast bias for each firm the 
analyst forecasts in year t minus the average bias of analysts from the high-status house who follow the firms, which we then 
average across the stocks that the analysts covers which provides us with a bias measure for analysts i in year t. The Rel_BIAS 
variable is the average of this relative forecast bias in year t and the two previous years. Analysts who have less than three prior 
years of experience are therefore excluded. Accuracy is a dummy variable taking the value of 1 if the analyst is ranked in the top 
10% in terms of their average 3 year forecast accuracy and zero otherwise. All other variables are as defined in the Appendix. 
Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors are clustered by company and analyst pair. *, **, and *** represent significance level 
of 5%, 1%, and 0.1%, respectively (two-tailed).  
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Panel D: The effect of absolute forecast bias on job separations  
 	
Dependent Variable= 
Move_status  Absolute Forecast Bias 
Variable  First Forecast Last Forecast 
  Coefficient 
Odds Ratio 
or Ratios of 
odds ratios Coefficient 
Odds Ratio or 
Ratios of odds 
ratios 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Abs_BIAS  -0.094    0.911    0.038    1.039    
	
 (-1.13)     (0.15)     
EMPLOYER  0.810    2.248    1.345**  3.839*   
	
 (1.24)     (2.32)     
Abs_BIAS*EMPLOYER  0.138    1.148    -2.532*   0.0795*   
	
 (0.31)      (-1.89)     
Gen_Exp  -0.028    0.972    -0.045**  0.956*   
	
 (-1.33)       (-2.02)     
Num_Co  0.040**  1.040*   0.034*   1.034    
	
 (2.35)     (1.95)     
Accuracy  0.112    1.118    0.055    1.057    
  (0.49)     (0.26)     
Status F.E.  YES  YES  
Year F.E.  YES  YES  
Observations	  568  516  
Pesudo-R2  28.2%  27.4%  
This table present estimations from the ordinal logit regression to examine if past forecast optimism from bank and non-bank 
analysts have different effect on the likelihood of analyst moves to a higher or lower status brokerage house during 1999 to 2006. 
The sample contains only those analysts from medium or low status houses. The dependant variable Move-status equals the value 
1 if the analyst in time t moves up one hierarchy of brokerage house status and the value of 2 if the move up represents a move of 
two hierarches. If the analyst moves side-ways then it takes the value of zero. If, however, the analysts moves down one 
hierarchy then it takes the value of -1. Similar with Hong and Kubik (2003), we measure the forecast bias for each firm the 
analyst forecasts in year t, which we then average across the stocks that the analysts covers which provides us with a bias 
measure for analysts i in year t. The Abs_BIAS variable is the average this forecast bias in year t and the two previous years. 
Analysts who have less than three prior years of experience are therefore excluded. Accuracy is a dummy variable taking the 
value of 1 if the analyst is ranked in the top 10% in terms of their average 3 year forecast accuracy and zero otherwise. All other 
variables are as defined in the Appendix. Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors are clustered by company and analyst pair. *, 
**, and *** represent significance level of 5%, 1%, and 0.1%, respectively (two-tailed). 
 
	
 
